Voting games with abstention: linking completeness and weightedness by Freixas Bosch, Josep et al.
Voting games with abstention: linking completeness and
weightedness
Josep Freixasa,1,, Bertrand Tchantchob, Narcisse Tedjeugangc
a\Departament de Matematica Aplicada 3 i Escola Politecnica Superior d'Enginyeria de Manresa
(Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya)." Spain.
bUniversity of Yaounde I, MASS laboratory - University of Cergy Pontoise, THEMA laboratory. France.
cUniversity of Yaounde I, Cameroon.
Abstract
Weighted games for several levels of approval in input and output were introduced in [9].
An extension of the desirability relation for simple games, called the inuence relation, was
introduced for games with several levels of approval in input in [24] (see also [18]). However,
there are weighted games not being complete for the inuence relation, something dierent to
what occurs for simple games. In this paper we introduce several extensions of the desirability
relation for simple games and from the completeness of them it follows the consistent link with
weighted games, which solves the existing gap. Moreover, we prove that the inuence relation
is consistent with a known subclass of weighted games: strongly weighted games.
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1. Introduction
Voting systems in democratic institutions, as those in international economic organizations
or federal voting bodies, have in common that voters must make decisions involving a choice
between multiple alternatives instead of the most usual assumption which assumes that voters
are only allowed to vote for \yes" or \no." The specic or denable decision context consists
of \either breaking the status quo or not." The target system describes each situation in which
partitions of voters are able to pass a new law or change the status quo. Making decisions
in democratic organizations is regarded as a DSS and an investigation of the DSS literature
reveals that research has mainly focused on the eects of design, implementation and use on
decision outcomes (see e.g., [3, 11]).
The generalization of simple voting games to multiple levels arose out of the observation
that, while many real voting systems allow voters to abstain (or be absent), simple games, by
their nature, cannot take this possibility into account; those who do not vote \yes" are presumed
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to vote \no." Some works that took more than two input alternatives into consideration are: [5,
19, 1, 12, 14, 16, 17].
The voting structures, we primarily consider in this paper are particular cases of (j; k) voting
systems introduced in [9], these structures assume that levels of approval in both, input and
output, are ordered. The paper is conned to the case k = 2 and is focused for j = 3 ordered
levels of input approval, although the results obtained in this paper extend for any arbitrary
greater value of j. When absent voters are taken into account with a quorum (like in [4] or
in [25]) the levels of input approval are not ordered and therefore, the results in this paper do
not extend to that context. Some (3; 2) voting systems are weighted (3; 2) systems which admit
a representation by means of vector weights and a threshold for the system, and therefore their
representations as weighted systems are useful to separate the two possible collective outcomes.
A purpose of this paper is to link the completeness of some desirability relations, that determine
the importance of voters in the system, with weighted systems with several ordered levels of
approval for the input.
A necessary but not sucient condition for a simple game to be representable as a weighted
game is to be complete, i.e., all players are pairwise comparable by the desirability relation,
which is a pre{ordering on the set of voters and therefore a reexive and transitive relation.
Consequently, an easy and practical way to identify some non-weighted simple games is to check
that they are not complete.
The notion of weighted game for (j; k) simple games is supported by a powerful combinatorial
argument, grade-trade robustness for partitions. Even the issue of ascertaining whether an
anonymous (j; 2) game is weighted is a dicult issue [10] and [26]. When we are restricted
to simple games, i.e., j = k = 2, weighted (j; k) games are simply weighted simple games
and grade-trade robustness for partitions (see [9]) is trade-robustness for coalitions (see [21]
and [23]).
In this paper, we will look at the extension of the desirability relation for simple games [13]
to the ternary voting game (or more generally for (3; 2) games) given in [24], wherein such an
extension was denominated inuence relation. In [24], it is proved that the inuence relation fails
to be transitive and cycles for players are possible. We observe that one may easily nd weighted
(3; 2) games which are not complete for the inuence relation, so that the completeness of the
game for the inuence relation is not a necessary condition for a (3; 2) game to be weighted. To
solve this gap we consider three separate new relations, each of them weaker than the inuence
relation. Then the desired notion of completeness is derived by demanding the completeness
of each one of these three new relations. This notion is weaker than the completeness for
the inuence relation, but it is enough to become a necessary condition for the (3; 2) game to
be weighted. Moreover, we will prove that the completeness derived by the inuence relation
becomes a necessary condition for a (3; 2) game to be strongly weighted, a subclass of weighted
games already considered in [9].
An additional issue is also considered in this paper. It concerns the associated notions of
swap-robustness for each of the three new relations introduced in the paper. These characteri-
zations extend the known characterization of complete simple games by swap-robustness given
in [22] and [20].
The paper is organized as follows. The technical background as well as an example are
introduced in what remains of this section. In Section 2 we introduce several notions of de-
sirability for (3; 2) games and consider their completeness, their restrictions and extensions to
simple games and the hierarchies they induce. In Section 3 we consistently link weighted (3; 2)
games with an appropriate class of complete (3; 2) games, and strongly weighted (3; 2) games
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with complete (3; 2) games with respect to the inuence relation. In Section 4 dierent (3; 2)
swap robustness properties, which restriction for the case of simple games constitutes a charac-
terization of complete games, are established for the derived notions of completeness for (3,2)
games. Conclusion ends the paper.
1.1. The class of (3; 2) simple games
The material on this section is essentially taken from Freixas and Zwicker [9], where (j; k)
simple games are introduced, for the particular choices: j = 3 and k = 2. Before the main
notions are introduced we need some preliminary denitions. An ordered tripartition of the
nite set N is a sequence S = (S1; S2; S3) of mutually disjoint sets whose union is N . Any Si
is allowed to be empty, and we think of Si as the set of those voters of N who vote approval
level i for the issue at hand (where approval level 1 is the highest level of approval, 2 is the
intermediate level and 3 the lowest level). The most relevant situation that happens in voting
is when S1 correspond to the set of `yes' voters, S2 to the set of abstainers and S3 to the set of
`no' voters. Thus, an ordered tripartition is the analogue of a coalition for a standard simple
game. Let 3N denote the set of all ordered tripartitions of N . For S; T 2 3N , we write S 3 T
to mean that either S = T or S may be transformed into T by shifting 1 or more voters to
higher levels of approval. This is the same as saying S1  T1 and S1 [ S2  T1 [ T2; we write
S 3 T if S 3 T and S 6= T . The 3 order dened on 3N has minimum: the tripartition
N such that N3 = N; and maximum: the tripartition M such that M1 = N ; i.e., for every
tripartition S, N 3 S 3 M holds.
Denition 1.1 A (3; 2) simple game G = (N;V ) (henceforth (3; 2) game) consists of a nite
set N of voters together with a value function V : 3N  ! f0; 1g, which satises V (N ) = 0,
V (M) = 1, and is monotonic: for all ordered tripartitions S and T , if S 3 T then V (S) 
V (T ).
A (3; 2) game is also dened by the set of winning tripartitions W = fS 2 3N : V (S) = 1g
that satises N =2 W , M 2 W , and the monotonicity requirement: if S 3 T and S 2 W then
T 2W:
Standard notions for coalitions in simple games naturally extend for tripartitions in (3,2)
games: S is a losing tripartition whenever V (S) = 0; let L denote the set of losing tripartitions;
S is a minimal winning tripartition provided that S is winning and for all T 2 3N such that
T 3 S; T is losing, let Wm denote the set of minimal winning tripartitions; S is a maximal
losing tripartition provided that S is losing and for all T 2 3N such that S 3 T; T is winning,
let LM denote the set of maximal losing tripartitions. It is clear thatW and L form a bipartition
of 3N , and that each of the sets: W , L, Wm, and LM uniquely determine the (3; 2) game.
Denition 1.2 Let G = (N;V ) be a (3; 2) game. A representation of G as a weighted (3; 2)
game consists of a vector w = (w1; w2; w3) where wi : N ! R for each i together with a real
number quota q such that for every tripartition S, V (S) = 1 if and only if w(S)  q, where
w(S) denotes
3X
i=1
X
p2Si
wi(p) and w1(p)  w2(p)  w3(p) for each p 2 N:
We say that G = (N;V ) is a weighted (3; 2) game if it has such a representation.
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As was observed in [9], each `yes' voter contributes the weight w1(p) to the total weight H;
each abstainer contributes w2(p) to H, and each `no' voter contributes w3(p) to H, with the
issue passing exactly if H meets or exceeds some preset quota q. That is, before any voting
takes place each voter is pre-assigned three weights with w1(p)  w2(p)  w3(p) for each voter
p, but will make no assumptions about the signs of w1(p), w2(p) or w3(p). As occurs for simple
games where two weights represent superuous information, three weights represent superuous
information. If we renormalize by subtracting w2(p) from each of the weights w1(p), w2(p) and
w3(p) then the new triple of weights w
+(p) = w1(p)   w2(p), 0, and w (p) = w3(p)   w2(p)
describes the same voting system, and satises w+(p)  0  w (p).
A stronger condition of a weighted (3; 2) game introduced in [9] is the following.
Denition 1.3 A strongly weighted (3; 2) game is a weighted (3; 2) game that admits a repre-
sentation such that for every pair of voters p and r, either
w+(p)  w+(r) and   w (p)   w (r)
or
w+(p)  w+(r) and   w (p)   w (r):
Note that, Denition 1.3 admits quite obvious extension for (j; 2) games, and therefore the
results proved in this paper for (3; 2) games naturally extend to the broader context of (j; 2)
games. We conclude this section with an example of a non-weighted (3; 2) game.
Example 1.4 Consider the (3; 2) game with set of voters N = fa; b; cg:
Wm = f(a; b; c); (b; c; a); (c; a; b)g
From the set of minimal winning tripartitions one may easily generate the set of winning
tripartitions, the set of losing tripartitions and the set of maximal losing tripartitions, which is:
LM = f(a; c; b); (b; a; c); (c; b; a); (;; abc; ;)g
One may check that it is not weighted since the weight of the three minimal winning tripartitions
are:
w+(a) + w (c); w+(b) + w (a) and w+(c) + w (b)
respectively, and the weight of the maximal losing tripartitions are:
w+(a) + w (b); w+(b) + w (c); w+(c) + w (a) and 0
respectively. If the game was weighted the system of the twelve inequalities obtained by pairing
the weights of minimal winning and maximal losing tripartitions would be consistent. However,
three of these inequalities (rst-rst, second-second and third-third) lead to a contradiction
w (c) > w (b); w (a) > w (c); w (b) > w (a)
hence the game is not weighted.
2. Several relations on the set of voters for (3,2) games
We start the original contents of the paper by introducing three separate relations on N for
(3; 2) games that constitute the main tool for linking weightedness and completeness.
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Denition 2.1 Let (N;V ) be a (3; 2) game.
(i) D+-desirability. Let S = (S1; S2; S3) be a tripartition, p and r be two arbitrary abstainers
p %D+ r () V (S1 [ p; S2 n p; S3)  V (S1 [ r; S2 n r; S3)
(ii) D -desirability. Let S = (S1; S2; S3) be a tripartition, p and r be two arbitrary \no"
voters.
p %D  r () V (S1; S2 [ p; S3 n p)  V (S1; S2 [ r; S3 n r)
(iii) D-desirability. Let S = (S1; S2; S3) be a tripartition, p and r be two arbitrary \no"
voters.
p %D r () V (S1 [ p; S2; S3 n p)  V (S1 [ r; S2; S3 n r)
Of course, V (S1[p; S2 np; S3)  V (S1[ r; S2 n r; S3) is equivalent to assert that (S1[ r; S2 n
r; S3) 2W implies that (S1 [ p; S2 n p; S3) 2W . And similarly for the two next inequalities in
Denition 2.1.
A player p is at least as D+-desirable as r if whenever r can transform a losing tripartition
in which both are abstainers into a winning tripartition by shifting his support from abstention
to full support, player p can achieve the same, ceteris paribus. Similar interpretations can be
given for the D  and D desirability relations.
Denition 2.2 (Tchantcho et. al. [24]) Let G = (N;V ) be a (3; 2) simple game, p and
r two voters. Voter p is said to be at least as inuential as r, denoted p %I r, if for all
(S1; S2; S3) 2 3N it yields:
 V (S1 [ p; S2 n p; S3)  V (S1 [ r; S2 n r; S3) if p; r 2 S2;
 V (S1; S2 [ p; S3 n p)  V (S1; S2 [ r; S3 n r) if p; r 2 S3; and
 V (S1 [ p; S2; S3 n p)  V (S1 [ r; S2; S3 n r) if p; r 2 S3:
The I-inuence relation, which is reexive but nontransitive, is a stronger condition of each
of the three separate relations given in Denition 2.1. Indeed, if p and r are two arbitrary voters
then:
p I r =) p %D+ r; p %D  r; p %D r
and at least one of the three relations is strict. Moreover,
p I r () p D+ r; p D  r; p D r
Now we introduce the induced notion of completeness for the three separate relations con-
sidered in Denition 2.1 and two additional ones. We recall that the notion of completeness for
the inuence relation (from now on I-completeness) was given in [24].
Denition 2.3 (i) A (3; 2) game is D+-complete if either p %D+ r or r %D+ p for all pair
p; r of voters.
(ii) A (3; 2) game is D -complete if either p %D  r or r %D  p for all pair p; r of voters.
(iii) A (3; 2) game is D-complete if either p %D r or r %D p for all pair p; r of voters.
(iv) A (3; 2) game is complete if it is D+-complete, D -complete, and D-complete.
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(v) A (3; 2) game is hierarchically complete or H-complete if it is complete and the total
rankings induced by %D+ , %D  , and %D coincide.
For the game in Example 1.4 we have:
D+ : a  b; c  a; b  c;
D  : a  b; c  a; b  c;
D : b  a; a  c; c  b:
The three relations %D+ , %D  and %D are complete and therefore the game is complete, but
not I-complete since none of these three relations is transitive.
The following result establishes some links between the dierent types of completeness. We
say that two relations on N , %1 and %2, are never opposite if p 1 r and r 2 p is impossible
for any pair p, r of voters.
Theorem 2.4 (i) If (N;W ) is H-complete, then %H , %D+ , %D  , %D are transitive, co-
incide with %I , and (N;W ) is I-complete.
(ii) If (N;W ) is I-complete, then %I is transitive, and %I , %D+ , %D  , %D are never oppo-
site relations, and (N;W ) is complete.
Proof.
(i) (N;W ) being hierarchically complete implies that %D+ ;%D  and %D are complete and
coincide.
Let p and r be two players. p I r is equivalent to p %D+ r; p %D  r and p %D r; and
at least one of the three relations is strict; p I r is equivalent to: p D+ r; p D  r and
p D r; and since %D+ ;%D  , and %D coincide, it is then obvious that:
 p I r implies p D+ r; p D  r and p D r; and
 p I r implies p D+ r; p D  r and p D r:
Thus %I ;%D+ ;%D  and %D coincide; and %I is complete since (N;W ) is complete.
With respect to transitivity: I-completeness implies I-transitivity (it was proved in [24])
and I-transitivity implies that %D+ ;%D  and %D are transitive, since these relations
coincide with %I .
(ii) We remark again that I-completeness implies I-transitivity. Moreover, it is obvious that
I-completeness implies that %D+ , %D  , and %D are complete (see the denition of %I),
and therefore (N;W ) is complete. Let p and r be two players:
 p I r implies p %D+ r, p %D  r, and p %D r, and
 p I r implies p D+ r, p D  r, and p D r:
Hence, %I ; %D+ ; %D  and %D are never opposite relations.

The transitivity of the inuence relation when the game is I-complete allows to talk about
I-hierarchy of the (3; 2) game, i.e., the specic total ranking for voters derived from the
I-relation. Similarly we may consider theH-hierarchy for the game derived from theH-relation.
A study on I-hierarchies for (3; 2) games can be found in [15].
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3. Weighted and complete (3; 2) games: coherency
For simple games it is well-known that if a voter has a greater weight than another then the
former voter is at least as desirable, as a coalitional partner, than the other. When three levels
are introduced in the input this matter becomes more complex, however a \good" denition for
desirability should be coherent with that of weightedness.
It is well known that for n > 5 there are simple games which are complete but not weighted.
However, for n > 2 there exist (3; 2) games which are complete but not weighted, see e.g.,
Example 1.4. Next Proposition shows that for n = 2 all (3; 2) games are (strongly) weighted.
It is also well known that for n > 3 there are simple games which are not complete.
Thus, any example of a simple game non-being complete provides an example of a (3; 2) game
non-being complete, where abstaining is tantamount to voting \no." As for n = 4 there are three
non-isomorphic simple games which are not complete, we conclude that for n > 3 (with the
addition of null voters if necessary) there exist (3; 2) games which are not complete. However,
next Proposition also shows that for n = 3 all (3; 2) games are complete.
Proposition 3.1 Every (3; 2) game with n = 2 is strongly weighted and every (3; 2) game with
n = 3 is complete.
Proof.
 Every (3; 2) game with n = 2 is complete, and moreover strongly weighted: see table
below.
Wm q w (1) w (2) hierarchy
1 (12; ;; ;) 2 (1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0) 1 I 2
2 (1; 2; ;) 1 (1; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) 1 I 2
3 (1; 2; ;) and (2; 1; ;) 1 (1; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) 1 I 2
4 (1; 2; ;) and (2; ;; 1) 1 (1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 1) 2 I 1
5 (1; ;; 2) 1 (1; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) 1 I 2
6 (1; ;; 2) and (2; ;; 1) 1 (2; 0; 1) (2; 0; 1) 1 I 2
7 (1; ;; 2) and (;; 12; ;) 0 (1; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) 1 I 2
8 (1; ;; 2) and (;; 2; 1) 0 (1; 0; 0) (0; 0; 1) 1 I 2
9 (;; 12; ;) 0 (0; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) 1 I 2
10 (;; 1; 2) 0 (0; 0; 1) (0; 0; 0) 1 I 2
11 (;; 1; 2) and (;; 2; 1)  1 (0; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) 1 I 2
12 (1; ;; 2) ; (2; ;; 1) and (;; 12; ;) 0 (1; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) 1 I 2
Table 1. List of (3; 2) games with n = 2 up to isomorphism.
 Every (3; 2) game with n = 3 is complete.
Assume that (N;W ) is a (3; 2) game such that N = fa; b; cg :
Proof that (N;W ) is D+-complete:
() Assume that the tripartition (a; b; c) is winning, then the tripartitions (a; bc; ;) and
(ac; b; ;) are winning as well. Hence, a %D+ b.
() Assume that the tripartition (a; bc; ;) is winning, then the tripartition (ac; b; ;) is
also winning.
If (a; b; c) =2 W and (b; a; c) 2 W; then (b; ac; ;) 2 W and (bc; a; ;) 2 W; hence
b %D+ a.
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If (a; b; c) =2W and (b; a; c) =2W; then as (a; bc; ;) 2W and (ac; b; ;) 2W; a %D+ b.
If (a; b; c) 2W , it reduces to () and a %D+ b:
(  ) Assume that (ac; b; ;) 2W:
If (a; bc; ;) 2W; it is (**).
If (a; bc; ;) =2W and (b; ac; ;) 2W , it is (**) with b playing the role of a.
If (a; bc; ;) =2W and (b; ac; ;) =2W; then (ac; b; ;) 2W ; (a; b; c) =2W and (b; a; c) =2W;
that is a %D+ b:
If the tripartitions (a; b; c) ; (a; bc; ;) and (ac; b; ;) are all not winning, then it is obvious that
b %D+ a: Hence, a %D+ b or b %D+ a: It is then easy to prove that a %D+ c or c %D+ a and
that b %D+ c or c %D+ b: Therefore, (N;W ) is D+-complete.
The proofs that (N;W ) is D -complete and D-complete are analogous. 
3.1. Weightedness implies Completeness
The next result shows that \carrying" more weight implies being more desirable in the
suitable level of approval. That's a useful result in order to connect weights and desirability
relations and, further, to connect weightedness and completeness. Moreover, the next result
is the main justication of the consideration of the three separate desirability orderings in
Denition 2.1.
Theorem 3.2 Given two arbitrary players p and r in a weighted (3; 2) game, for any weighted
representation of it, we have:
(i) w+(p)  w+(r) implies p %D+ r,
(ii)  w (p)   w (r) implies p %D  r, and
(iii) w+(p)  w (p)  w+(r)  w (r) implies p %D r.
Proof.
(i) Assume that w+(p)  w+(r). As:
w(S1 [ p; S2 n p; S3) = w(S1; S2; S3) + w+(p) and
w(S1 [ r; S2 n r; S3) = w(S1; S2; S3) + w+(r) it yields:
w(S1 [ p; S2 n p; S3)  w(S1 [ r; S2 n r; S3), and therefore:
V (S1 [ p; S2 n p; S3)  V (S1 [ r; S2 n r; S3). Hence, p %D+ r.
(ii) Assume that  w+(p)   w+(r). As:
w(S1; S2 [ p; S3 n p) = w(S1; S2; S3)  w (p) and
w(S1; S2 [ r; S3 n r) = w(S1; S2; S3)  w (r) it yields:
w(S1; S2 [ p; S3 n p)  w(S1; S2 [ r; S3 n r) and therefore:
V (S1; S2 [ p; S3 n p)  V (S1; S2 [ r; S3 n r). Hence, p %D  r.
(iii) Assume that w+(p)  w (p)  w+(r)  w (r). As:
w(S1 [ p; S2; S3 n p) = w(S1; S2; S3) + (w+(p)  w (p)) and
w(S1 [ r; S2; S3 n r) = w(S1; S2; S3) + (w+(r)  w (r)) it yields:
w(S1 [ p; S2; S3 n p)  w(S1 [ r; S2; S3 n r) and therefore:
V (S1 [ p; S2; S3 n p)  V (S1 [ r; S2; S3 n r). Hence, p %D r.

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Some important corollaries are derived from the previous result.
Corollary 3.3 Every weighted (3; 2) game is a complete (3; 2) game for which the three rela-
tions %D+ , %D  and %D are transitive.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3.2 since for every two arbitrary players either w+(p)  w+(r)
or w+(p)  w+(r). Hence, either p %D+ r or r %D+ p; and the same occurs for relations %D 
and %D .
Moreover, if p; r; s 2 N with w+(p)  w+(r)  w+(s), then p %D+ r, r %D+ s and also
p %D+ s. Similar reasonings apply to %D  and %D respectively. 
Corollary 3.4 A strongly weighted (3; 2) game is a I-complete (3; 2) game.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3.2 since strongly weightedness for the game implies that for
any two arbitrary voters p and r either [p %D+ r, p %D  r and p %D r] or [r %D+ p, r %D  p
and r %D p] which implies p %I r or r %I p, and therefore I-completeness for the game. 
The following three items summarize the most important results of this section:
(i) Completeness and transitivity of the three separate relations considered is a necessary
but not sucient condition for a (3; 2) game to be weighted.
(ii) Strongly weighted (3; 2) games are weighted (3,2) games being I-complete. Thus I-completeness,
which implies transitivity for %I , is a necessary but not sucient condition for a (3; 2)
game to be strongly weighted.
(iii) There exist (3; 2) games which are weighted but not I-complete.
Note that (i) is the desired property, linking weightedness and completeness, for (3; 2) games
that we were looking for and which is the analogous for simple games for which weighted games
are complete; (ii) tells us that I-completeness, which is a stronger condition than completeness,
is a necessary condition for a (3; 2) game to be strongly weighted, whereas (iii) points out the
existence of weighted (3; 2) games non-being I-complete.
Remark 3.5 (i) w+(p)  w+(r) and  w (p)   w (r) implies p %D r, whereas p %D+
r and p %D  r does not imply p %D r (see e.g., Example 1.4).
(ii) w+(p) > w+(r) implies p %D+ r, but not necessarily implies p D+ r. Analogously,
 w (p) >  w (r) implies p %D  r, but not necessarily implies p D  r. Analogously,
w+(p) w (p) > w+(r) w (r) implies p %D r, but not necessarily implies p D r.
4. Swap robustness
The purpose of this section is to provide necessary and sucient conditions for a (3; 2)
game to be complete in terms of swaps among tripartitions. To this purpose we previously
need to give necessary and sucient conditions in terms of swaps among tripartitions for the
completeness of the game for each of three relations: %D+ , %D  , %D .
Denition 4.1
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(i) A (3; 2) game is swap+-robust if for all S; T 2 W , p 2 S1 \ T2 and r 2 S2 \ T1 either
((S1 n p) [ r; (S2 n r) [ p; S3) wins or ((T1 n r) [ p; (T2 n p) [ r; T3) wins.
(ii) A (3; 2) game is swap -robust if for all S; T 2 W , p 2 S2 \ T3 and r 2 S3 \ T2 either
((S1; (S2 n p) [ r; (S3 n r) [ p) wins or ((T1; (T2 n r) [ p; (T3 n p) [ r) wins.
(iii) A (3; 2) game is swap-robust if for all S; T 2 W , p 2 S1 \ T3 and r 2 S3 \ T1 either
((S1 n p) [ r; S2; (S3 n r) [ p) wins or ((T1 n r) [ p; T2; (T3 n p) [ r) wins.
(iv) A (3; 2) game is swap-robust if and only if it is swap+-robust, swap -robust and swap-robust.
A given (3; 2) game (N;W ) is swap+-robust means that for any two winning tripartitions S
and T , two players p and r such that p is a yes-voter in S while being an abstainer in T , r is
an abstainer in S while being a yes-voter in T , the permutation of p and r between S and T
yields two tripartitions for which at least one is still winning.
Mutatis mutandis the same reading for swap -robustness and swap-robust.
Proposition 4.2
(i) A (3; 2) game is D+-complete if and only if it is swap+-robust.
(ii) A (3; 2) game is D -complete if and only if it is swap -robust.
(iii) A (3; 2) game is D-complete if and only if it is swap-robust.
(iv) A (3; 2) game is complete if and only if it is swap-robust.
Proof.
(i) ()) Assume that (N;V ) is D+-complete. Let p and r be two arbitrary abstainers. As
V is D+-complete either p %D+ r or r %D+ p. Assume w.l.o.g. r %D+ p, and consider
two arbitrary winning tripartitions S and T with p 2 S1 \ T2 and r 2 S2 \ T1, then
((S1 n p) [ r; (S2 n r) [ p; S3) wins since r %D+ p.
(() Assume that V is swap+ robustness, w.l.o.g. assume that S, T (with p 2 S1 \ T2
and r 2 S2 \ T1) and ((S1 n p) [ r; (S2 n r) [ p; S3) are winning tripartitions. Let B =
(B1; B2; B3) = (S1 n p; S2 [ p; S3), then p; r 2 B2 and 1 = V (B1 [ r;B2 n r;B3) 
V (B1 [ p;B2 n p;B3) which implies r %D+ p.
(ii) Mutatis mutandis the same.
(iii) Mutatis mutandis the same.
(iv) It follows from the three previous items.

Note that Tchantcho et al. [24] gave a similar characterization for I-completeness in terms
of swaps among tripartitions (called here I-swap robustness). Of course, I-swap robustness
implies swap robustness, while the converse is not true.
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5. Conclusion
Unlike the desirability relation dened for (2; 2) games for which every weighted game is
complete, there exist weighted (3; 2) games that are not complete under the inuence relation
(I-inuence) introduced and studied by Tchantcho et al [24]. Indeed, this relation is very strong.
We consider as in [18] the three separate relations that compose the inuence relation dened
in [24]. The completeness of each of these relations is a necessary condition for a (3; 2) game
to be weighted. Moreover, the completeness of the I-inuence relation is a necessary condition
for a (3; 2) game to be a strongly weighted (3; 2) game.
One major concern of the paper [24] is to link the I-inuence relation to the extension of
Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and the two Coleman pre-orderings introduced in [6, 7, 8] respectively.
One future of this work is to proceed to such comparisons. Another work concerns the study of
dierent power indices for games with a priori unions in the context of games with abstention,
as is mainly done in [2] for simple games.
Finally, it is worth noting that although this paper deals with (3; 2) games, all the results
obtained in sections 2, 3 and 4 can be easily be extended to (j; 2) games.
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